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This paper addresses the growth of academic spin-off and the incubation policies concerned. 
To this purpose it presents theory of firm growth and policy theory based on evolutionary 
principles. This is followed by an empirical analysis of learning by spin-off firms to overcome 
barriers to growth and of factors that influence growth. Spin-off from Delft University of 
Technology in the Netherlands serves as a case study. The results indicate that the main 
barriers are concerned with knowledge (skills) in interaction with the market and in dealing 
with uncertainty in management, a situation that can be explained by a major change in 
required routines. Further, the results indicate needs of spin-off firms for external networking 
and diversity in preventing (solving) problems. This situation points to a preference for 
incubation policies that have moved away from comprehensiveness and centralisation to 
policies of customized support and some degree of self-organisation.  
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1.  Setting the Scene 
Universities and other higher education institutes can play important roles in regional 
economic development (e.g. Etzkowitz 2002; Felsenstein 1996; Florax 1992). Universities 
have extended activities beyond their primary tasks of education and research, into the area of 
commercialisation of knowledge and business activity. To this purpose they have established 
a range of new institutions and policies, like technology licensing offices, industry liaison 
offices, Science Parks, and extensive incubation policies. From a regional economic 
perspective, policies to enhance spin-off processes and to foster growth of small firms 
(incubation policies) can be seen as most relevant. 
 
Small firms have attracted attention from regional scientists and policymakers since decades 
for various important reasons. Birch (1979), for example, forwarded that small firms create 
more jobs than large firms, whereas Rothwell and Zegveld (1985) argued that small firms 
have a distinctive role to play in innovation, be-it differently from sector to sector. In the 
latters’ view t he dynamic interaction of small firms with larger ones forms the basis for 
industrial regeneration. In the 1980s also many success stories of local high-technology 
developments mushroomed, stressing the role of universities in local entrepreneurial culture, 
e.g. in Silicon Valley and the Cambridge area (UK) (e.g. Rogers and Larsen 1984; Wickstead 
1985). This was followed by more solid insights into the generation of local knowledge 
spillovers by university research (e.g. Acs et al. 1992; Anselin et al. 1997), and the role of 
supportive local networks, supportive institutions and organisational structures of companies 
(e.g. Braczyk et al. 1998; Castells and Hall 1994; Saxenian 1994). 
 
This paper addresses academic spin-off firms as a specific category of high-technology firms. 
In the academic spin-off process, not only the new technology stems from the university but 
also the new entrepreneurs have their origin here, as graduates or as (former) staff members. 
For entrepreneurs the business environment of high-technology start-ups is highly different 
from the academic environment they are used to, in terms of uncertainty perceived and ways 
to cope with it. This situation might hamper growth of the new firms due to failure of 
adopting the right business strategy  at the right time. Attention paid to differences in the 
amount of spin-off activity between universities is rather limited (e.g. Di Gregorio and Shane 
2003), as is the attention paid to the determinants of growth of academic spin-off and to 
theory that contributes to a deeper understanding of this growth. We mention the work of   3
Lowe and Taylor (1996), Reid and Garnsey (1998), and Roberts (1991). Only in the context 
of particular business locations, i.e. Science Parks, research on growth of academic spin-off 
has been and still is popular, e.g. During (1998), Felsenstein (1994), Lindelöf and Löfsten 
(2003), Siegel et al. (2003), and Westhead (1997). 
 
Much policy attention has been given in the Netherlands to high-technology entrepreneurship 
in the past few years, particularly with the aim to increase the popularity of this 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship in high-technology fields is not popular, as witnessed by a 
share of high-technology start-ups of 6 to 7% in all newly established firms (10% on average 
in  Europe and 25% in US). Major obstacles to high-technology entrepreneurship are 
institutional and typically contribute to an unfavourable entrepreneurial climate (Baljé and 
Waasdorp 2001; Ministry of Economic Affairs 1999; Meijaard 2001). For example, there is 
strict regulation for new firm establishment, including the requirement of a mandatory 
minimum capital (approximately 18,000 Euro) for a limited liability company, and failure 
(bankruptcy) gives a stigma to the entrepreneur, a situation that hampers to take risks. In 
addition, at universities the development of entrepreneurial personality traits and skills has 
been under-examined in the standard curriculum, and important legal matter is not (yet) 
solved satisfactorily, i.e. how to cope with potential “conflicts of interests” between academic 
work and the own business. These circumstances fit into generally weak ambitions of Dutch 
universities to become entrepreneurial.  
 
While this picture is rather negative, it must be stressed that both from the side o f the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the side of university boards quite some improvements have been 
introduced recently in their policies to enhance high-technology (academic) entrepreneurship 
(van der Laag and Snijders 2003). This has manifested itself  inter alia in a relaxation on 
regulation concerning new firm establishment and in extension of training in entrepreneurial 
skills in the curriculum of universities. 
 
Note that in the past few years the relationship between university, industry and government 
has changed importantly. In this context, Etzkowitz (2002) puts emphasis on a shift in 
relationships from a one-way linear flow  - from basic to applied research to production  - to an 
interactive two-way flow with involvement of many organisations within the university, 
industry and government. Accordingly, incubation takes place at many places within the 
university departments (not just in one incubator site) and as part of many networks within   4
and outside the university. Moreover, the borders between i nterests and roles of the 
organisations involved are blurring, witness the emergence of academic industrialists and 
entrepreneurial universities, etc. (Gibbons 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001). In the case of science, 
there is now a higher democratic content and increasing need for legitimation and public 
responsibility of science. As a consequence of all this, there is a trend for knowledge creation 
and economic utilisation of knowledge to become more volatile within fast shifting network 
configurations and to b ecome more complex. This situation leads to an increased uncertainty 
in incubation policies. The development of new technologies in a business environment adds 
to this uncertainty, for example, concerning issues of protection of intellectual property, 
acceptability of products by consumers, matching with environmental and safety standards, 
and economic viability and profitability (e.g. Kowol and Küppers 2003). 
 
In this study of academic spin-off evolutionary principles are adopted that enable to perceive 
firms and policy actors in their changing environment and to focus on adjustment over time. 
The questions addressed are:  (1) Which is the motivation to start a business as academic spin-off 
and how is this connected to the pattern of learning and capital investment? Which situations are 
seen as problematic and which factors influence growth of academic spin-off? (2) How can 
results on problems and factors that influence growth contribute to an improved policymaking 
for incubation, given the changing relationship between university, industry and government?  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, key evolutionary notions on strategy development 
and survival by firms are discussed, and this is followed by a discussion of evolutionary notions 
on policymaking (Section 2). Next, case study results on spin-off from Delft University of 
Technology are highlighted. An analysis of the motivation to start a firm (Section 3) is followed 
by an analysis of learning behaviour and capital investment (Section 4). In Section 5 the focus is 
on problematic needs and factors that influence growth, including the estimation of a growth 
model. The paper proceeds with an analysis of trends in incubation policies (Section 6). In a 




2.  An Evolutionary Approach to Firms Behaviour and Policymaking  
Applied to firms, evolutionary approaches seek to explain the movement of these units over time 
and the causes of their state at one point in time in terms of how they got there. The movement of 
firms refers to their patterns of adaptation to change in the selection environment, including the   5
role of learning  (Dosi and Nelson 1994; van Geenhuizen 1999; Krohn and van den Daele 1998). 
Resource dependence views are useful in this context, because these provide notions about fast 
changing needs of firms, recognise knowledge as an important resource, and connect with 
evolutionary approaches in putting emphasis on different resource availability in the 
environment and different abilities (skills) of firms to utilise them (Pfeffer and Salanchik 1978; 
Reid and Garnsey 1998). 
 
Evolutionary approaches and the related management literature provide the following important 
notions for the a nalysis of the behaviour of high-technology start-ups over time (Arthur 1994; 
Baaij and van den Bosch 1999; Dosi and Nelson 1994; van Geenhuizen 1999; Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Senge 1990): 
 
-  Firms  are subject to various forms of selection, with the market as the single most 
important  selection environment . In addition, there are selection environments such as 
government regulation and patenting regimes (institutions). With regard to high-
technology firms, the technology is increasingly seen as an important selection 
environment. Competition, be-it for customers or for major inputs like government 
research budgets, is generally the main mechanism of selection. 
-  Different from Darwinian theory, the survival of firms does not rest on mutation by 
chance but on active adaptation to the environment. The process of adaptation is mainly 
directed by  routines, i.e. forms of rule-guided behaviour that are largely invariant to fine 
changes in the environment. Routines function as stable carriers for knowledge and are 
based upon the learning history of the firm (entrepreneur). 
-  Routines are associated with  incremental adjustments, i.e. close to pre-existing patterns. 
In such adjustment pattern there is the danger that firms' behaviour becomes  path-
dependent, a situation in which it is difficult to abandon once selected directions, e.g. 
technologies and product-markets, due to an accumulation of investment, experience, and 
solid positions in networks. In circumstances that are significantly new, however, firms 
are able to experiment and discover novel behaviour, including imperfect adaptation and 
new discovery based on failure. 
-  A situation of  stress arises when changes in the environment are occurring too fast for a 
timely adaptation or when firms (entrepreneurs) undertake too many adaptations at the 
same time (van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp 1996). Stress may be solved by a   6
comprehensive and often shock-wise adjustment of the firm to its environment 
(restructuring). 
-  The need for adjustment causes a continuous need for  learning. In terms of what is 
learned one may distinguish between (1) learning about specific fields like a technology 
and its application, (2) learning of specific skills like concerning management and 
marketing, (3) learning about behaviour of important socio-economic a ctors in the 
environment, like investors and potential partners in co-operation, and (4) learning to 
become a learning organisation. The latter means to prevent cognitive lock-in by 
remaining open to new information and transforming this new information into strategic 
action (e.g. Pettigrew and Wipp 1991).  
-  Resilience is important in the context of survival of populations of firms (van den Bergh 
and Fetchenhauer 2001). This notion is concerned with the need for diversity among 
firms, including co-operative  networks, e.g. for R&D, marketing, and subcontracting 
relationships. Although networking bears a risk in itself due to the need for appropriate 
management of network relations, participation in networks usually reduces risks 
(Camagni 1991; Johannisson et al. 1994). 
 
What is mentioned above for firms is partly also true for policy organisations in a dynamic 
environment. Thus, learning and adjustment are major issues in evolutionary reflections on 
policymaking, as is the role of uncertainty in policymaking (e.g. Benz and Fürst 2002). 
Policymakers may deal in different ways with the uncertainty they encounter, as can be 
illustrated by the following two extreme models: (1) to prevent any uncertainty and to plan the 
process and the product of policymaking in a strict and comprehensive way, and (2) to recognise 
uncertainty as a basic attribute in policymaking and to utilise it in a positive way, by planning 
incrementally and leaving the process open, while continuously learning from experiments, 
monitoring of ongoing developments, etc. (e.g. van Geenhuizen and Thissen 2002). 
 
 
3. Motivation of Entrepreneurs  
Spin-off from Delft University of Technology is used as a case study in this paper. Delft 
University of Technology is in the medium-sized town of Delft, midway t he larger cities of 
The Hague and Rotterdam in the Western part of the Netherlands. The university has adopted 
a central supporting policy to academic entrepreneurship since 1998. This initiative, named 
“Technostarters”, provides a program of support measures from which start-ups select those   7
ones that are useful to their personal needs, such as a loan (without interest) to a maximum of 
16.800 Euro, use of accommodation at one of the faculties, and coaching by faculty members. 
The program is open to graduates (including doctorates) while staff members also qualify. 
Our sample includes both “Technostarters” and firms that received support in other ways from 
the university (Note 1). 
 
It is interesting to know what motivation lies behind the relatively large “jump” taken by 
graduates and staff from Delft University of Technology in starting a business. Table 1 shows 
that motivations related with personal achievement rank high. These motivations are based on 
personal needs and skills related to independence, self-realisation and satisfaction with work. 
The desire to be independent ranks first as a motive for establishing a firm. 
 
Table 1 Motivation to start a firm 
Motivation  Average           Rank 
Score (a)       
Personal achievement                    To be independent  4.19                         1 
                                                       To use own creative skills  4.16                         2 
                                                       To have more satisfaction in work  4.12                         3 
                                                       To be the decision-maker   3.91                         4 
   
Opportunities (e.g. material)        To exploit market opportunities  3.72                         5 
                                                      To meet a service or need of society  3.09                         6 
                                                      To make a lot of money  2.93                         7 
                                                      To have more prosperity in the future  2.86                         8 
   
Working conditions                      To be able to work at home  1.98                         9 
a. Based on a 1-5 point scale; number of firms: 43. 
 
Motives like grasping market opportunities and increasing material prosperity rank lower. The 
wish to work at home receives the lowest score as a motivation. Working at home is not 
realistic in the case of needs for laboratory experiments. Despite the recognition of various 
opportunities, starting entrepreneurs are also aware of the large risks taken. For that reason, 
most start-ups of Delft University of Technology (84%) are founded by more than one person, 
i.e. 60% by two persons and 24% by three or more persons.  
 
The desire to be independent is reported more often as the most important motive to start an 
own firm (e.g. Roberts 1991). Accordingly it may be expected that the entrepreneurs are   8
reluctant to become dependent in other ways, like in building learning relations and  attracting 




4.  Learning and financial capital 
Although relationships between university and industry have become tighter and more varied in 
the past decade, there remains a gap in routines between learning to do research at a technical 
university and running a technology-based firm. Undertaking research in technology means to 
reduce risks, mainly in experimentation (to control for as much influences as possible), whereas 
running a technology-based company means taking large and often unknown risks. This situation 
calls for the adoption of significantly new routines aside from maintaining the ones that remain 
necessary for carrying out high-level R and D. Taking courses is one way of bridging the gap in 
routines. A majority of the start-ups takes courses provided by Delft University of Technology or 
external parties (consultancy firms) (65%). It appears that  courses on basic entrepreneurial 
knowledge (skills) for starting and managing a firm receive high s cores in terms of 
importance for business performance (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2  Evaluation of courses on importance (a) 
Course content  Average score           Rank 
Entrepreneurial        Writing/using a business plan    3.62                                 1 
                                 Communication and promotion    3.57                                 2 
                                 Market research    3.49                                 3 
                                 Leadership and motivation    3.46                                 4 
                                 Selling skills    3.42                                 5 
                                 How to obtain finance    3.05                                 8 
Planning                  Financial planning    3.32                                 6 
                                Time management    3.14                                 7 
Operational             Staff training and recruitment    2.84                                 9 
                                Book keeping    2.65                                10 
a) Based on a 1-5 scale; number of firms: 43; 10 most important course contents. 
 
Writing and using a business plan ranks first and is followed on short distance by various 
components related to interaction of firms with the market, i.e. communication and 
promotion, market research and selling skills. Leadership and motivation is an equally 
important component.  
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In preventing or solving problematic situations, learning from external parties tends to be as 
important (54%) as learning within the firm, including a new partner (46%) (Table 3). This 
pattern may indicate a trend for spread of risk and search of diversity, in other words, 
independence. Such a trend can also be observed with regard to the type of external sources 
(partners) in learning. It appears that Delft University of Technology is an important partner in 
achieving knowledge (34% of all sources), but it is certainly not the only one. Next important are 
customers and suppliers (each around 19%).  
 
Table 3  Learning relations 
Learning connected with obstacles  Abs.              Share (%) 
Learning from external parties (networks, consultants)   14                         53.8 
Learning from a new partner     3                         11.5 
Learning by doing (experiencing) or studying      6                         23.1 
Learning from new personnel     3                         11.5 
Totals   26                       100.0 
   
External learning sources   
Delft University of Technology   25                         33.8 
Other university     6                           8.1 
Customers   15                          20.3 
Suppliers   14                          18.9 
Open sources: internet and literature   14                          18.9 
Totals   74                         100.0 
 
 
A trend for independence is also apparent in the way the new firms attract financial capital. The 
most important source is own revenues (Table 4). Although each firm has the opportunity to 
utilize a wide variety of c apital sources, almost three-quarters of the firms (72.1%) make use of 
capital generated in the firm, by e.g. routine experiments or advisory work. Formal investors are 
only important for a minority of firms (34.9%); particularly venture capitalists lack p opularity 
(7.0%). When compared with research elsewhere it becomes clear that the above pattern of small 
use of formal investors complies with financial sources in the initial stages of start-ups (e.g. 
Roberts 1991). There is maybe a small difference in the most important source: many studies 
report on personal savings as the most available source of capital, not revenues from the own 
business. In addition, informal investors, like family, friends and wealthy individuals (“angels”) 
seem less important in Delft (11.6%) than in other places. 
 
The strategy of internal investment among Delft’s spin-off indeed reduces dependency of 
entrepreneurs on formal investors. At the same time it causes a limited focus on innovative   10 
activities, potentially leading to delay  in market introduction of the innovative products. In the R 
and D intensive biotechnology, a lack of focus is seen as the major cause of failure of new firms. 
 
Table 4 Sources of financial capital 
Source  Frequency of mentioning 
as an important source 
% share of firms (a) 
Bank       12       27.9 
Venture capitalist         3         7.0 
Informal investor         5       11.6 
Revenues from own firm       31       72.1 
Remaining (b)       13       32.4 
Totals        64   
a. A firm can utilize more than one source. 
b. For example a loan from TU Delft, funding subsidies, salary (as staff member). 
 
 
5. Problematic Needs and Growth 
The paper now proceeds with an analysis of needs that are seen as problematic by start-ups. 
Knowledge (skills) appear to be the most important class of problematic needs (51%) (Table 5). 
These problematic needs mainly refer to interaction with the market, i.e. marketing and sales 
(each about 13% of all problematic needs), and this complies with the previously discussed high 
appreciation of such components in courses. It needs to be stressed that markets for high-
technology firms are strongly specialised. For example, new types of metal coating (processed 
using nanotechnology) have potential applications in machinery for food processing and in m etal 
components of ships. Each market has its own structure, with dominant players and networks 
that need to be sufficiently known by the entrepreneur. At the same time, while penetrating these 
markets, entrepreneurs are eager not to loose independence. Another market obstacle is the 
image of start-ups among large customers as not sufficiently experienced. This situation works 
like a vicious circle. However, if once transactions have taken place with a large customer it is 
much easier to find subsequent large customers. 
 
Needs for market knowledge and skills are followed by various needs for management skills. In 
this context, dealing with uncertainty is seen as an important problem (14%). This result 
illustrates the sharp transition that entrepreneurs are f acing, including the adoption of new 
routines. The capability to deal with many different management tasks simultaneously (overload) 
is seen as another problem (10%). Aside from knowledge (skills) problems, there are financial 
problems, particularly shortage of cash flow (14%). All other issues, like accommodation of the 
start-up and available infrastructure, appear of minor importance.  With regard to development   11 
over time, knowledge (skills) problems remain after the first year, while some problems tend 
to increase or decrease (Soetanto 2002). The problem of skills to handle management 
overload increases in importance, whereas problems of physical accommodation become less 
relevant. This pattern complies with resource-based insights (Reid and Garnsey 1998)  in that 
the need for basic resources and concomitant problems change over time. 
 
Table 5  Problematic needs  
Problematic need  Specification  Abs.       %         Rank 
Knowledge (skills)  Marketing knowledge  20        14.5           1 
  Dealing with uncertainty  19        13.8          2/3 
  Sales skill  17        12.3           4 
  Management (overload)  14        10.1           5 
Finance  Cash flow  19        13.8          2/3 
  Investment capital    9          6.5          7/8 
  R&D investment (development)     7          5.1         10 
Physical   Accommodation    8          5.8           9 
  Infrastructure    5          3.6         11 
  Distance    1          0.7         12 
Market  Demand   10         7.2           6 
Government  Regulation, bureaucracy    9          6.5          7/8 
Totals     138      100 
 
 
The analysis now turns to the extent to which the previously indicated circumstances, like 
motivation to start a business and problematic needs, influence growth of start-ups. To this 
purpose a growth model is developed and estimated (Note 2). The reasons why particular 
explanatory factors are included in this model can be summarized as follows. First, the kind of 
motivation of the founder (s) to start a firm is expected to play a role (e.g. Watson and Scott 
1998).  What will make a difference is whether the motivation includes aspects related with 
independency (and personal achievement) or aspects related with seizing business 
opportunities (more materialistic reasons). A second factor that is likely to influence growth 
of start-ups is the (main) founder’s rank in the family. Most founders of technology-based 
firms are first-born children, a phenomenon ascribed to the fact that these children usually 
take larger responsibilities (e.g. Lowe and Taylor 1990). It seems reasonable that they are also 
better prepared in preventing and overcoming obstacles in the early growth stages. A third 
factor of influence is the number of founders. A relatively large growth is expected in a 
situation of more than one founder because risks are shared and more knowledge and skills 
are available to tackle problematic situations. Fourth, age of the firm will play an important 
role in growth. We expect an increase of growth per year with increasing age of the firm,   12 
based on the idea that  - after overcoming obstacles of the foundation process  - entrepreneurs 
“climb” on their learning curve and become better adjusted to business circumstances. 
Making use of support measures is also included in our model as an explanatory factor for 
growth. This  is based on arguments from resource dependence theory. Small high-technology 
firms lack some basic resources, like capital and particular knowledge (skills). Those who are 
able to organize access to these resources at the right time have better chances to survive and 
grow compared with other ones. Finally, it is plausible that facing serious problems in 
business activity has a hampering influence on growth. We expect a negative influence of 
knowledge and skills barriers, i.e. concerning marketing, management overload and coping 
with uncertainty. 
 
On the basis of the above considerations the following equation for growth of start-ups can be 
formulated: 
JOBGROWTH  =  A + B1 (MOT)+B2  (FAMRANK)+ B3 (NRFOUND) + B4 (FIRMAGE) + 
 B5 (INTSUP) + B6 (EXTSUP) + B7 (LACKMAR) + B8 (MANLOAD) + B9 (DEALUNCERT)  
 
Where: 
JOBGROWTH:   Job increase per year in full time equivalent  
MOT:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if the motivation has to do with 
independence factors and is zero in all other cases. 
FAMRANK:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if first-born child and is zero in 
all other cases. 
NRFOUND:    Number of founders (persons). 
FIRMAGE:    Age of the firm (in years). 
INTSUP:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if use of TU Delft support and 
is zero in all other cases. 
EXTSUP:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if use of other (external) 
business support and is zero in all other cases. 
LACKMAR:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if the firm is facing lack of 
marketing knowledge (skills) and is zero in all other cases. 
MANLOAD:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if the firm is facing managerial 
overload and is zero in all other cases. 
DEALUNCERT:  Dummy variable that attains the value 1 if the firm recognises  
problems in dealing with uncertainty and is zero in all other cases. 
 
We expect the coefficients  B1, B 2, B3, B 4, B5 and B6 to be positive and the other B coefficients 
to be negative. In the following we summarise the results of the estimation of the model.  
 
Most of the factors discussed appear to play a significant role in the growth of start-ups (Table 
6). However, a striking result is that the estimation of the influence of factors associated with   13 
the founder, i.e. his/her motivation and family ranking, does not yield the expected significant 
results. Thus, there is no evidence that personal independence motives and being a first-born 
child have a positive influence on growth. What may help understanding this outcome is the 
frequently occurring situation of multiple-founders, in which the capacity of the main founder 
is enriched with capacities of co-founders. Also, the estimation of the role of managerial 
overload does not lead to significant results; there is no evidence of influence of this barrier 
on growth. A potential explanation is that personal perceptions of the entrepreneur play a role 
here, i.e. in the qualification of management overload as a problem, aside from the 
management capacity at hand that differs from firm to firm. 
 
The estimation of all other factors brings to light a significant influence on growth, in most 
cases with the expected sign. Thus, more than one founder clearly advances growth. 
Apparently, spread of risk over more than one founder and a broader availability of 
knowledge (skills) enhance growth. Similarly, age  of the start-up influences growth, meaning 
that older firms tend to grow faster than younger ones. After some time of experience, the 
crucial business routines are apparently acquired and internalised by the entrepreneurs. 
Further, the estimation results o n the use of support clearly point to influence on growth. 
However, there is a difference between internal support (from Delft University of 
Technology) and external support. The sign of the first coefficient is positive as expected, but 
the latter coefficient is negative.  
 
Table 6 Regression analysis of the growth of start-ups 
  Coefficients  Significance  
Constant     -1.180   
     
Independence motives        0.161         
Family ranking     - 0.002         
Number of founders        0.680        ** 
Age of the firm        0.169        ** 
Internal (TU Delft) support        0.433        ** 
External support     - 0.346        ** 
Lack of marketing knowledge (skills)     - 1.016        ** 
Management overload        0.289         
Dealing with uncertainty        1.599        ** 
     
R
2         0.710   
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
   14 
This result, however, not necessarily indicates a negative influence of external support on 
growth. What may happen is that most firms seek external support only in a relatively late 
stage of problem recognition and solving, meaning that the firms’ development is already 
affected by a downward trend. In this situation, using external sources tends to be in vain. 
 
Further, the estimation of the influence of two problems yields significant results. H owever, 
in the case of problems in dealing with uncertainty the sign is different from expected, i.e. 
positive. This means that entrepreneurs who recognise dealing with uncertainty as a problem 
tend to perform better than other ones. What may be helpful in explaining this result is to see 
the recognition of this problem in connection with the development of adequate strategies. 
Thus, if entrepreneurs consider uncertainty as a problem, they prepare themselves better and 
develop pro-active and adaptive strategies to deal with large risks. Our final estimation result, 
i.e. the influence of lack of marketing knowledge (skills) on growth, conforms the 
expectations. Start-ups that are facing this problem tend to grow on a lower level than other 
start-ups. 
 
From a  policymaking point of view it is now interesting to see which of the above-indicated 
influencing factors can be brought “under control” by means of policy measures of the 
university. The following factors lend themselves for such a steering:  number of founders, 
use of internal university support, lack of marketing knowledge (skills), and dealing with 
uncertainty. 
 
6.  Incubation Policies  
In general, universities develop policies to enhance survival and growth of start-up firms by 
providing facilities that match with limited resources of these start-ups and using: 
 
-  Selection processes: screening and selection of promising and viable business ideas. 
-  Monitoring systems: following ongoing developments of start-ups in the frame of 
identifying policy impacts. 
-  Seedbed conditions in incubator facilities: supplying a broad range of measures, like 
cheap and flexible space, shared services (secretarial, cleaning, restaurant), research 
facilities at the university, courses and mentoring, and access to various networks. 
-  Specifically financial capital: taking equity shares in start-ups, for example to pay for up-
front patenting and licensing expenses, and establishing internal venture capital funds.   15 
 
How the previous policy is designed and what policy measures are included depends on two 
dimensions of policymaking that are closely related with valuation of uncertainty at hand and 
coping with this uncertainty. These dimensions are comprehensiveness of support measures 
(content) and openness in policymaking (process) (Figure  1). On the first dimension there are 
two extremes, i.e. policies offering comprehensive packages of support  - including subsidised 
space, shared services, access to networks, etc.  - and programs through which start-ups select 
single or a couple of support  measures in a customised way. On the second dimension one 
extreme refers to centralised (top-down) models of policymaking, i.e. real estate development in 
one location based on a clear and pre-determined image of how incubators should be, e.g. to 
serve interaction (learning) between entrepreneurs. These incubators are often “flag ships” of the 
university through their physical presentation. The other extreme refers to models of open 
policymaking with a focus on self-organisation of start-ups and with a focus on networking; 
these models enable both concentration of start-ups (incubator) and spread of them in department 
buildings and outside the university. Entrepreneurs design the kind of support they prefer and 
determine the diversity (specificity) provided  based on the principle of “the entrepreneur knows 
best”. These ongoing and open processes are accompanied by loose forms of steering on key 
processes and actors (networks) (e.g. De Bruijn et al. 1998). 
 
Policymaking that fits into the left upper part of Figure 1 aims to prevent or to reduce uncertainty 
as much as possible and policymaking that fits into the right under part takes advantage of 
uncertainty by allowing self-organisation and piecemeal planning, including learning from 
experiments and from monitoring ongoing developments.  
 
Figure 1  Types of policymaking for incubation 
Dimensions  Comprehensive                   Custom-made packages 







adaptive, diverse, open)  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
There is no blueprint available for policies that  enhance survival and growth of academic spin-
off. Local situations may differ significantly, e.g. in terms entrepreneurial culture of universities, 
size and structure of local and regional economies, and technology specialisation of universities. 
In addition, valuation of uncertainty differs between cultures in large parts of countries and 
continents (Hofstede 1997). This means that incubation policies need to be based on a careful 
matching with these situations. Incubation policies preferably also comply w ith needs of start-
ups. The case study used in this paper has pointed to the following needs:  
 
•  Multiple founders. 
•  Learning about relevant markets and skills to penetrate these markets.  
•  Learning to cope with uncertainty and to develop adequate strategies. 
•  Diversity in learning partners. 
•  Diversity in financial sources and small dependence of formal sources (early stages) 
•  University support, particularly supplied in a timely manner. 
 
Given the strong role of independence and preference for diversity among start-ups in our 
case study, models of policymaking in the upper left-hand corner of Figure 1 seem outdated 
for the situation at universities in Northwest Europe. Rather, up-to-date policymaking models 
find themselves more down and on the right-hand side. This fits into a broader awareness of a 
trend for increased complexity in the links between university, industry and governments, 
mainly the rise of new roles and interests, and volatility in new networks. In such situations, 
policies are preferably adaptive both in the type of policymaking process and in the measures 
selected (Walker et al. 2001). 
 
The existing evidence suggests that incubation policies allowing for a certain selection of 
support in a customised way  – the case of Delft  – positively influence the growth of academic 
spin-off. Additional research should be undertaken to determine whether comparable start-ups 
(age, sector, etc.) in places not affected by an incubation policy perform less well; in other 
words, a control group needs to be included  in the research. A second research avenue would 
be to identify different models in policymaking for incubation across different cultures, based 
on a different appreciation of uncertainty, and to determine under which conditions these are 
successful in stimulating growth of academic spin-off.   17 
Note 1 
The sample represents a selected category of spin-off firms: (1) established after 1995 and 
survived in 2002, (2) established in Delft and located here in 2002, (3) support from the 
university (mostly Technostarters program). The original sample size is 64 firms. All of them 
received a written questionnaire. With a response rate of 67.2%, this has led to 43 valid 
responses. Non-response seems partly based on unfavourable business development.  
A major point is the generality of the results. It is reasonable to assume that the results can be 
generalised to young start-ups from technical universities and technical faculties within general 
universities in Northwest Europe under similar institutional conditions as the Netherlands. This 
would mean that the problems observed in Delft hold true for larger populations of entrepreneurs 




The analysis is limited to those factors that are important according  to the literature, or for which 
plausible arguments are available. It is also limited to factors that show a sufficient 
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